Court ruling casts shadow over EES, union contract
By Thomas Wilson, staff, Elizabethton Star,
A Tennessee Court of Appeals ruling regarding the illegality of a collective bargaining contract between a public utility and a labor union could cast a shadow over the existing union contract between the Elizabethton Electric System and the union representing more than 20 EES employees.
A unanimous ruling issued in December 2000 by a three-judge panel of the state's eastern district Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's ruling that a contract between a municipally owned electric utility and a labor union was null and void.
The appellate court's ruling came in the case of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 760 v. the City of Harriman and Harriman Utility Board. The IBEW had appealed the ruling from the Roane County Chancery Court that found the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the Harriman Utility Board was illegal.
Presiding Judge Houston wrote the court's opinion, which was joined by judges Charles Susano and Herschel P. Franks. In the Court of Appeals' ruling, Goddard wrote: "We find nothing in the Charter of the City of Harriman that either expressly or impliedly grants the city of Harriman, or derivatively, the Harriman Utility Board, the power to engage in collective bargaining or to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Nor are we aware of any statutory law in this state that grants such power."
The appellate court's ruling raises questions whether the collective bargaining agreement signed in 2002 between the Elizabethton Electric System and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 934 is enforceable as a legal document. The EES Board of Directors approved a three-year collective bargaining agreement with Local 934 of IBEW in June 2002. The contract will expire in three months.
EES interim general manager Tim Reeser said on Monday that the union represents 21 ground men and linemen employed by the utility. Reeser declined to comment about the contract except to say the utility would be reviewing possible ramifications of the court ruling.
"We're going to be checking to see how that would affect us in the future," said Reeser, who referred further questions about the ruling to the utility's legal counsel John Banks.
When contacted Monday afternoon, Banks declined comment about the case or what possible impact it could have on the electric system's existing contract with the union.
Local 934's business manager Roger Farmer could not be immediately reached for comment on Monday.
According to the case background, the Harriman city government created the Harriman Utility Board in 1939. Employees of the Utility Board subsequently chose to become members of Local 760 of the IBEW.
The Harriman Utility Board and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement in June 1949. The agreement constituted a labor contract, covering employees of the Utility Board. Over the years this original agreement, as modified and ratified, was carried forward and culminated in the agreement.
In October 1997, within the context of a labor dispute between the Utility Board and Local 760, the Harriman city attorney issued an opinion declaring that the Harriman City Council and the Harriman Utility Board had no power or authority to engage in collective bargaining with city employees or with union representatives.
The city attorney's opinion further declared that the results of any such bargaining were void.
Relying upon the opinion of the city attorney, the Utility Board subsequently declined to continue bargaining negotiations with the union. The board also declined to process grievances filed by the union on behalf of employees and former employees, according to the case background.
Union members along with several employees and former employees of the utility filed a lawsuit in the Roane County Chancery Court in May 1998 seeking enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement previously entered into by the board and the union.
Thereafter, the Utility Board filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the agreement was beyond the authority of the board, against public policy and, therefore, void. The city of Harriman later filed a motion to dismiss and alternatively for summary judgment.
The Roane County Chancery Court entered a judgment in May 1999 granting the motions of the city and the utility board and dismissing the union's complaint. The lower court's opinion held that the city of Harriman and the Harriman Utility Board were without authority to enter into the collective bargaining agreement with the local and that the agreement was, therefore, illegal and void.
The union and employees appealed the lower court's ruling.
The appellate court referenced the case of Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Vick, which was ruled on by the state Court of Appeals in 1957. According to that case background, striking employees of the Weakley County electric system maintained that the county electric system could lawfully enter into a contract with a labor union with respect to employees and their working conditions. The Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed, citing a California case for the proposition that "to hold to the contrary would be to sanction government by contract instead of government by law." The Court of Appeals ruled that contract to be null and void.
The appellants argued that the holding set forth in Weakley no longer represented the law in Tennessee. The appellants argued that municipal corporations were not now prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining with their employees based on three state statutes.
The first two statutes relied upon by the appellants granted municipalities the right to engage in collective bargaining with public education professionals and transit workers, respectively.
The appeals court ruling in Harriman case states, however that these statutes are limited in application to the specific groups as designated by law. The court found the appellants' argument that the two statutes invest municipal corporations with the right to engage in collective bargaining in general was "without merit."
The appellate court's opinion refuted a third statute the plaintiffs argued recognized a general right of all public employees to engage in collective bargaining because said statute did not specify classification of public employees.
The court's opinion stated that statute "only applies in those instances where the authority to engage in collective bargaining is otherwise granted. (The statute) does not, in itself, grant or extend such authority."
The ruling made in 2000 found that the union or the utility's employees were without express or implied authority, either by statute or under the charter of the city of Harriman, to engage in collective bargaining or to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the city or utility board.
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